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Commentary
Taxation: Disclaimer or Renunciation
Under Nebraska Statutes
Persons have a right to and should consider the tax con-
sequences of many of their acts, as taxes take an increas-
ingly larger bite of the income or corpus of individual
assets. There appears to be nothing morally reprehensible
or legally wrong for a person who has never received the
benefit or income from a bequest, to disclaim that be-
quest ....
I. INTRODUCTION
Estate planning should not cease at someone's death, for post-
mortem estate planning can be as effective in altering tax conse-
quences as planning done before death. Indeed, in those instances
where the decedent has died intestate, it is the only planning that
is done. The chief tool facilitating such post-mortem planning is the
disclaimer,2 which traditionally is the refusal or rejection of an es-
tate or right offered to a person.3 For gift and estate tax purposes
the pertinent definition is "complete and unqualified refusal to ac-
cept rights to which one is entitled."4  By following this definition
and properly disclaiming, unwanted property can be kept out of the
disclaimant's gross estate without gift tax consequences being in-
curred. In such cases, the property will be considered as having
passed directly from the original transferor to the ultimate recipi-
ent by virtue of the disclaimer, with the disclaimant being bypassed
altogether.
The utility of this tool is demonstrated by its effect on the dou-
ble taxation which is imposed on inherited but unwanted property.
Once property is inherited, it cannot be disposed of by the recipi-
ent without an additional tax being imposed. If the recipient keeps
1. Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 66 (8th Cir. 1973).
2. The terms disclaimer and renunciation as used in this area are synony-
mous. To avoid confusion this article will use the term disclaimer al-
most exclusively.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 550 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
4. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(d) (6) (1958), 20.2055-2(c) (2) (1958), 20.2056
(d)-1 (1958), and 25.2514-3 (c) (5) (1958).
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the property until his death, it is taxed in his estate,5 while giving
the property away during his lifetime subjects it to the gift tax.6
In effect, the recipient's tax consequences have been dictated by the
decedent. Post-mortem use of disclaimer in such a situation elim-
inates this tax duplication. In addition, disclaimer can also be used
to increase or decrease the marital estate tax deduction,7 increase
the charitable estate tax deduction, 8 alter adverse income tax conse-
quences, 9 and change the disposition of property passing after
death.10
II. FEDERAL DISCLAIMER LAW
A. Statutory Basis
The federal law of disclaimer is purely a tax law. While federal
tax laws designate what interests or rights will be taxed, state laws
create those legal interests and rights." The federal law of dis-
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited as CODE] § 2033.
6. CODE §§ 2501, 2511.
7. CODE § 2056(d) allows a surviving spouse or other beneficiary to dis-
claim. Prior to 1966 property disclaimed by another beneficiary was
considered as passing, not to the surviving spouse, but to the person
who made the disclaimer, in the same manner as if the disclaimer had
not been made. Id. § 2056 (d) (2), 68A Stat. 395 (1954). As amended
in 1966, the section now allows a disclaimed interest to be viewed as
passing directly from the decedent to the surviving spouse and so to
qualify for the marital deduction. CODE § 2056(d) (2). The cor-
responding regulation has not yet been amended to reflect this change.
Treas. Reg. 20.2056(d)-1 (1958). If the spouse disclaims, that prop-
erty no longer is eligible for the marital deduction. See Estate of
Olive R. Swenson, 65 T.C. 21 (1975).
8. CODE § 2055. Irrevocable disclaimers of interests qualify for the char-
itable deduction from the gross estate.
9. One beneficial income tax use of disclaimer is to shift the income from
a trust to another beneficiary in a lower tax bracket. Another is spe-
cifically allowed by CODE § 678. Under this section, a grantor who
holds the sole power to vest corpus or income in himself is required
to report the trust income as his own. By disclaiming within a rea-
sonable time after becoming aware of this power, the grantor can
avoid this requirement. Id. § 678 (d).
10. It is not within the scope of this article to detail the explicit tax bene-
fits of disclaimers. For details of the beneficial uses which can be
made of disclaimers, see Finnell, Disclaimer and Marital Deductions,
21 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1968); Newman & Kalter, The Need for Dis-
claimer Legislation-An Analysis of the Background and Current Law,
28 TAx L. 571 (1975); Smith, Property and Tax Consequences of Re-
nunciations and Disclaimers, 96 TRUSTS AN EsTATEs 744 (1957); Ward,
Practical Aspects of Disclaimers of Donees, Heirs and Legatees, N.Y.U.
16TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1037 (1958).
11. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1939).
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claimer gives no right to disclaim, but only sets out when such dis-
claimers will or will not be taxable. It creates no property rights,
but governs how rights created by the states will be taxed. The
question of federal disclaimer is whether a disclaimer which is valid
under the local law will be respected for estate tax purposes.
The law of federal disclaimer is outlined in section 25.2511-1(c)
of the gift tax regulations. 12 The section speaks in terms of "the
right to refuse to accept ownership" rather than of disclaimer, but
the intent is clearly the same. This section, which deals with the
application of the gift tax to "indirect" transfers, specifically ex-
empts disclaimer transactions from taxation if they meet the fol-
lowing four criteria: (1) the refusal must be effective under local
law; (2) it must be unequivocal; (3) there must be no acceptance
of the property prior to refusal; and (4) the refusal must be made
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the
transfer. 3 If these four criteria are met, there is no transfer and,
therefore, there is no gift tax.
The key to the applicability of disclaimer to other sections of
the gift and estate tax provisions is found in the section 25.2511-1 (c)
definition of "transfer," for the gift and estate taxes are predicated
on there being a "transfer" of interest. If there is no transfer,
there is no tax. Since the gift tax was passed to supplement the
estate tax, the two are in pari materia and must be construed to-
gether.' 4 Therefore, if there is no transfer for gift tax purposes,
then there is no transfer for estate tax purposes. Since properly
disclaimed property cannot be pulled into the gross estate by sec-
tion 2033 as property in which the decedent had an interest at
death, and since a proper disclaimer is not a transfer so as to allow
the property to be pulled into the gross estate by sections 2035 to
2038, disclaimers can alter estate taxes as well as gift taxes. Indeed,
disclaiming to alter estate tax consequences is probably the more
common use of this tool.
Although section 25.2511-1 (c) speaks of "right to refuse" rather
than disclaimer, other sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
("Code") and its accompanying Treasury Regulations ("regula-
tions") do specifically use the term "disclaimer." Code sections
2041 on inherited powers of appointment,' " 2514 on donated powers
of appointment,' 6 2056 on estate tax marital deductions, 1'7 and 2055
12. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (c) (1958).
13. Id.
14. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
15. CODE § 2041(a) (2).
16. Id. § 2514(b).
17. Id. § 2056(d).
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on estate tax charitable deductions1 8 all expressly provide for tax
exemptions for disclaimed property. These sections establish essen-
tially the same criteria for a valid disclaimer as are set out in sec-
tion 25.2511-1(c). Sections 20.2041-3 (d) (6) and 25.2514-3 (c) which
establish the disclaimer criteria for their corresponding Code sec-
tions use exactly the same four criteria found in section 25.2511-
1(c). The marital and charitable deduction sections differ from
these others in some respects, but they still have language requiring
that the refusal be unequivocal and that there must have been no
acceptance of the property prior to refusal.19 Furthermore, none
of the differences found in these sections is of major import. Both
the marital and charitable deduction sections require a more spe-
cific time standard for disclaiming than the "reasonable time after
knowledge of the transfer" used by the other sections. A disclaimer
affecting the marital or charitable estate tax deduction must be
made within the time for filing the estate tax return, which is either
nine months or such longer time as is granted pursuant to the ex-
tension provision of section 6081.20 The reason for this different
standard is the need to close out the estate within a reasonable time.
The nine month limitation is simply a factual determination of what
constitutes a reasonable time in this type of situation.
Neither the marital nor the charitable deduction sections in-
clude a requirement that the disclaimer be valid under local law,
but effectiveness under local law is a requirement by implication,
for it is still state law which creates the legal interests and rights,
while federal revenue acts only designate what interests or rights,
so created, will be taxed. When section 2056 was amended in 1966
to allow a disclaimed interest to qualify for the marital deduction, 21
the Senate report on the bill specifically recognized that "[a] dis-
claimer for the purposes of this bill .... [m]ust be a valid refusal
under State law .... *,22
In addition to the four specific criteria for federal disclaimer set
out in section 25.2511-1(c), the section also covers partial disclaim-
ers. Where a partial refusal is attempted, "the determination of
18. Id. § 2055(a).
19. In addition to the general requirement that the refusal must be un-
equivocal, the Code and regulation sections on charitable deductions
define the situation even further by adding the caveat that if consid-
eration is received for the disclaimer, the rights to which the disclaim-
ant was entitled were not completely and unqualifiedly refused.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c) (2) (1958). The disclaimer is thus invalid
for federal estate tax purposes.
20. CODE § 6081 allows for time extensions for extenuating circumstances.
21. See note 7 supra.
22. S. REP. No. 1599, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
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whether or not there has been a complete and unqualified refusal
to accept ownership will depend on all of the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, taking into account the recognition
and effectiveness of such a purported refusal under the local law. '23
Again, this same language is found in sections 20.2041-3 (d) (6) and
25.2514-3 (c) on inherited and donated powers of appointment. How-
ever, neither the marital nor the charitable deduction Code and
regulation provisions make any mention of the effect of partial dis-
claimers. It is difficult to say what interpretation should be given
to this, but if the estate and gift tax Code sections are to be read
in pari materia, it is arguable that the provision for partial disclaim-
ers in section 25.2511-1 (c) of the gift tax regulations should be read
into these sections also.
In all these Code and regulation sections on disclaimer, only
the time limits on disclaiming, the absence of prior acceptance, and
the unequivocal nature of the disclaimer are distinct federal re-
quirements. Local law, whether specifically or implicitly included,
sets all other disclaimer specifications and thus plays an immense
part in federal disclaimer law, especially in determining what kind
of property can be disclaimed. Furthermore, these federal require-
ments might even be redundant since they include factors which
would be considered in determining the validity of the disclaimer
under local law.
For the most part the federal requirements have not been
fleshed out by case law or Internal Revenue Service ("Service")
interpretations. However, an indication of the position the Service
will take on such matters is given in Revenue Ruling 76-156.24 The
question there was whether a beneficiary who renounces a bequest
given under a decedent's will is deemed to have made a taxable
gift if he exercises a special power of appointment created under
the will over the disclaimed property. The decedent's adult child
was left the residue of the estate with a provision that the residue
could be renounced, and if it were, the child could appoint the re-
nounced interest to any of the decedent's issue or spouses of such
issue. Such provisions were authorized under the state law. The
beneficiary proceeded to renounce the residue and appoint one-
fourth of the residuary estate to the wife of the beneficiary's de-
ceased son and the remaining three-fourths to this deceased son's
two children.
The Service's position, as delineated in the revenue ruling, is
that if a beneficiary renounces a bequest and yet is able to direct
23. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (c) (1958).
24. Rev. Rul. 76-156, 1976 INT. REv. BULL. No. 17, at 22.
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that renounced bequest to the natural objects of his bounty by exer-
cising a special power of appointment which allows the property
to be disposed of in a way not specifically ascertainable from the
terms of the will, then the beneficiary has had the opportunity to
dispose of property which supposedly has been unequivocally re-
nounced. The renunciation in such a situation no longer is a com-
plete and unqualified refusal of ownership. The Service holds that
the true import of this situation is that the beneficiary is making
a transfer of his own property interest and thus should be taxed
on that transfer.
If only the disclaimer were available, in this situation the prop-
erty could pass to the same beneficiaries either by statute or by
direct provision in the will, and the disclaimer would still be valid.
If only the special power of appointment were authorized by the
will, it would be exercisable without incurring tax consequences as
long as the rules against appointing to one's self, one's estate or
creditors were met. However, the Service relies on the fact that
the two occur together as justification for ruling that the transac-
tion is taxable and argues that:
Congress intended to tax gifts in the broadest and most compre-
hensive sense possible, which include all 'transactions whereby
property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or
conferred upon another, regardless of the means or devise em-
ployed' Section 25.2511-1(c) of the regulations. 25
The Service ignores the fact that the quoted section goes on to
exclude disclaimed property from the definition of such transac-
tions by saying that a disclaimer is not a "transfer" for the purposes
of the tax statutes.
As an additional argument, the Service says this particular
disclaimer is not valid since it is not "unequivocal," as required by
section 25.2511-1 (c). It is difficult to see the justification for this
finding, for it would appear that such a disclaimer is just as unequi-
vocal a refusal to accept the property as a disclaimer which results
in exactly the same disposition, but where the disposition of the
property following the disclaimer is dictated by statute or rigid
specifications in the will, rather than by a special power of appoint-
ment.
The Service's position on this is just a position and not a hard
and fast rule of law, but the practitioner should be aware of its
presence so that potential conflict with the Service may be avoided
by proper drafting. If the same purpose can be accomplished with-
out using a special power of appointment, that would be the safer
course.
25. Id. at 23.
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B. Case Law Interpretation
Although many courts have decided cases on the basis of what
constitutes a valid disclaimer under local law so as to qualify for
federal tax purposes, 26 there is a dearth of reported cases clarifying
the purely federal disclaimer requirements.2 7 Perhaps the most im-
portant of these few cases on the federal requirements is Keinath
v. Commissioner,28 wherein the Eighth Circuit recognized the sep-
arate federal requirements and yet interpreted them by reference
to state law.
In Keinath, the taxpayer was the beneficiary of a trust estab-
lished by his father's will in 1944, the income of which was to be
paid to the testator's widow for life. Upon her death the principal
was to be divided between the taxpayer and his brother. If either
son predeceased the mother, that son's children would get a per
stirpes share of their father's half. The taxpayer thus had a vested
remainder interest in one-half of the trust subject to divestment
only if he predeceased his mother.
The mother died in 1963, and within six months the son filed
a disclaimer of his half interest with a reservation clause in favor
of his children. Prior to the filing of the disclaimer, the Minnesota
district court had been petitioned for an order construing the effect
of the disclaimer. It held that the disclaimer was effective under
Minnesota law. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commis-
sioner") claimed that the disclaimer was not effective for the pur-
poses of federal law and assessed a gift tax deficiency. The Tax
Court upheld the assessment on the grounds that, according to the
federal requirements, the disclaimer not only had to be effective
under local law, but that it also had to be made within a reasonable
time after the disclaimant learned of the transfer. The Tax Court
26. E.g., Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 836 (1952) (intestate disclaimer invalid); Brown v.
Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933)
(partial disclaimer valid); Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336
(N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 468 F.2d 950 (1972) (disclaimer of jointly
owned securities invalid).
27. Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973) (waiver of con-
tingent interest 19 years after the grantor died, but only six months
after interest vested was held valid for federal tax purposes); Estate
of C. Warren Caswell, 62 T.C. 51 (1974) (disclaimer made after the
date of filing the estate tax return was not valid for the purpose of
altering the marital deduction); Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961)
(disclaimer of life estate after receiving the income for 25 years in-
validated disclaimer for federal tax purposes although it was held
valid by the state court).
28. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
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and the Commissioner reasoned that the taxpayer learned of the
transfer 19 years previously upon his father's death and that 19
years was not a reasonable period of time to wait to disclaim.29
Although the Eighth Circuit agreed that a standard of validity
based entirely on state law was not the correct one to apply,30 it
held that the taxpayer had not waited an unreasonable period of
time to file his disclaimer under either state or federal regulations.
The Eighth Circuit judges viewed the transfer in question as having
been made not at the time the trust was established, but 19 years
later when the remainderman came into control.
In coming to its decision, the Keinath court took the position
that the Commissioner had the right to set forth in the Treasury
Regulations the conditions under which disclaimers would be recog-
nized, and that state law was relevant only to the extent recognized
in the Code or regulations. Having taken this position, the court
had to consider the scope of the vague federal requirements: (1)
the disclaimer must be recognized and effective under local law;
(2) it must be made within a reasonable time after knowledge of
the existence of the transfer; (3) there can be no disclaimer after
there has been acceptance of the transfer of the property; and (4)
the disclaimer must be unequivocal.3 ' Since there was no federal
definition of "reasonable time" or of when that time period should
commence to run, the court looked to state law for guidance, al-
though it would not be binding on the federal court. A review of
state cases led the court to decide that the time period did not com-
mence until the life beneficiary died, and that disclaimer within six
months after the life beneficiary's death was a reasonable time even
by federal standards.
Finally, the circuit court also took exception to the following
language in the Tax Court's opinion:
The exception from taxation for disclaimers was designed to per-
mit a donee to avoid receiving an unwanted gift or bequest
within a reasonable time after learning of the gift or bequest:
it should not be used as an estate planning and tax avoidance
tool.32
And in response said:
We think in giving full and fair effect to the law of disclaimer
that a person's motives are immaterial, and if he has a right to
29. Id. at 60.
30. "We are concerned here with the exercise of federal taxing power and
state law participates only to the extent recognized in the federal stat-
ute or Treasury Regulation." Id. at 61.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Pauline Keinath, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
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disclaim he may do so for any reason. Persons have a right to
and should consider the tax consequences of many of their acts,
as taxes take an increasingly larger bite of the income or corpus
of individual assets. There appears to be nothing morally repre-
hensible or legally wrong for a person who has never received
the benefit or income from a bequest, to disclaim that bequest,
provided of course, that the disclaimer is done in accordance with
the applicable law and the Treasury Regulations implementing
that law.33
The state of the law on federal disclaimers, at least in the Eighth
Circuit, appears to be that effectiveness under local law is a condi-
tion precedent to effectiveness under federal law, but that the inde-
pendent federal requirements listed in the Treasury Regulations
must also be met. However, since no ascertainable standards are
set out in these regulations, the courts are free to look at the law
of the states to determine what the reasonable standards should be.
Since the federal law is so dependent upon state law, whether
beneficial use of disclaimer is possible depends on how developed
the disclaimer law of the particular state is. Where the local law
on disclaimers is sketchy or nonexistent, making beneficial use of
disclaimers is uncertain at best. Perhaps even worse is the situa-
tion where the local law on disclaimers is quite clear-and also
quite restrictive. There are many common law restrictions on dis-
claimers which operate to limit their application. One such restric-
tion still followed in many jurisdictions is the applicability of dis-
claimers only to testate property. In those jurisdictions property
passing under a will may be disclaimed, but property passing under
the intestacy laws is considered as passing automatically by opera-
tion of law and may not be disclaimed.3 4 Other common law restric-
33. 480 F.2d at 66.
34. In intestate succession, for reasons dating back to feudal law where
an heir was not allowed to avoid the gift tax by renouncing, title
passes by operation of law and vests in the recipients immediately
upon the death of the decedent. 6 BowE-PARKER: PAGE ON WILLs §
49, at 36 (1962). Common law jurisdictions still follow this reasoning.
In Hardenbergh, the court held that a Minnesota decedent's widow and
daughter could not renounce in favor of the son without paying a gift
tax because the decedent died intestate, making title vest in the
mother and daughter immediately. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952).
There seems to be little reason for such a distinction today. Indeed,
UNFoRm PROBATE CODE § 2-801, Comment states:
Although present law in all states permits renunciation of a
devise under a will, the common law did not permit renunci-
ation of an intestate share. There is no reason for such a dis-
tinction. ...
The reason for the distinction between testate and intestate takers was
given so little thought that after the Hardenbergh decision, the Min-
nesota legislature passed a very liberal disclaimer statute doing away
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tions include limitations on partial disclaimers,35 and prohibitions
against disclaimers of jointly-held property36 and spendthrift
trusts. 37 Such restrictions severely hamper the use of disclaimers
as a tax avoidance tool.
with the distinction. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.211 (Supp. 1976),
525.532 (Reissue 1975).
The absurd results of a rule retaining the distinction can be seen
in William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952). The surviving spouse re-
nounced all interest as sole beneficiary under the will. This meant
he would still succeed to the property under the statutory rules of in-
testacy, so he also disclaimed his intestate interest. The Tax Court
recognized the disclaimer of the testate interest, but not that of the
intestate interest, so the surviving spouse was held to have made a
taxable gift. Had there been a residuary clause or another beneficiary
under the will, the disclaimer would not have been a gift for no prop-
erty would pass by intestacy.
35. State courts usually try to determine whether the gift is one single
gift or whether it is severable. If it is severable it can be disclaimed
in part. For example, in Routzahn, the court held the gift of one-third
of the decedent's estate to be separate from a life estate in the resi-
dence left in the same will. 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933). In finding
that the bequests were separate, the court determined that there was
no intent to make the acceptance or enjoyment of one depend upon
acceptance of the other. The surviving spouse was thus allowed to
accept the life estate and disclaim the one-third interest in the estate
as a whole.
36. The reasoning behind not allowing a disclaimer of any part of jointly
owned property is that such a disclaimer cannot apply to property
which is already absolutely owned by the person attempting to dis-
claim. There is no devise of joint ownership property since the right
of survivorship operates outside the normal probate or intestacy pro-
visions. The survivor, by virtue of the nature of the tenancy, simply
continues to own and possess that which was already owned. The
property is viewed as vesting at the creation of the tenancy and not
at the death of the first tenant. See Bishop v. United States, 338 F.
Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970). There the court held that under
Mississippi law a surviving husband could not avoid gift tax by dis-
claiming the interest he had as a surviving registered joint owner of
securities. The interest he had was in a joint estate and as such was
a present possessory interest. He could not disclaim that which he
already owned and possessed.
37. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 524, at 603 (2d ed.). The reason-
ing behind not allowing this kind of disclaimer is that if a beneficiary
can disclaim a spendthrift trust, he is able to accelerate his remainder
interest and so thwart the donor's restrictions. However, the majority
American position currently seems to be that such disclaimers should
be allowed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 36 (1959); Com-
merce Trust Co. v. Flast, 396 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1965). Those who
would allow disclaimers of spendthrift trusts view the spendthrift pro-
visions as no different than any other burden on which a gift is condi-
tioned and thus capable of being disclaimed. See generally Annot.,
14 A.L.R.3d 1437 (1967).
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III. NEBRASKA LAWS
A. The Nebraska Disclaimer Act
Until 1971 there was little ascertainable law on disclaiming prop-
erty in Nebraska. No reported cases or state statutes directly ad-
dressed the issue. In 1971 the Unicameral passed L.B. 53538 which
became the Nebraska Disclaimer Act ("Disclaimer Act"), codified
as sections 30-129 to 30-135 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. 9
Modeled after the Illinois 40 and Minnesota 41 statutes on disclaim-
ers,42 L.B. 535 had as its stated purpose to provide for disclaimers
by persons succeeding to interests in property passing by will, intes-
tate succession, deed, trust or otherwise.43 Testimony before the
Judiciary Committee indicated that because of the uncertainty of
the law on the area and the common law restrictions on intestate
disclaimer, disclaimers were not an effective tax tool in Nebraska.
44
This act was to relieve that uncertainty and lift the restrictions on
disclaimer.
Basically, the Disclaimer Act provides for a written disclaimer
which must describe the interest to be disclaimed, and must be
signed and acknowledged by the disclaimant,4 5 and filed with the
probate court (and also with the registrar of deeds if the property
to be disclaimed is real estate) 46 within ten months of the death
38. L.B. 535, 82d Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. (1971).
39. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-129-135 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
40. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 15(b), (c), (d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
41. Mxx. STAT. ANN. § 501.211 (Supp. 1976), § 525.532 (Reissue 1975).
These statutes were passed in the aftermath of the Hardenbergh de-
cision. See note 34 supra.
42. Hearings on L.B. 535 Before the Judiciary Committee, 82d Leg., 1st
Sess. 29 (March 2, 1971) (remarks of Mr. Lundstrom).
43. Id. (statement of purpose).
44. Id. at 25-29 (remarks of Mr. Aitken and Mr. Lundstrom).
45. Disclaimer; contents; execution. The disclaimer shall (1) de-
scribe the interest, part thereof or shares or assets thereof dis-
claimed, (2) be signed and acknowledged by the disclaimant
in the manner provided for the execution of deeds of real
estate, and (3) declare the disclaimer and the extent.
NF. RE . STAT. § 30-132 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
46. Disclaimer; place of filing. The place of filing the disclaimer
shall be the court in which the estate of the decedent or the
donee of the power is administered or if there is no admin-
istration within ten months after the death of the decedent
or donee, then in the court of any county provided by law
as the place of probate or administration of the estate of the
decedent or donee. If an interest in real estate is disclaimed,
a copy of the disclaimer also shall be recorded in the office
of the register of deeds in the county in which the real estate
lies. In addition, a copy of the disclaimer shall be delivered
or mailed to the personal representative of the estate, the
trustee of any trust in which the interest disclaimed exists or
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of the decedent, or within ten months of the time when the taker
is finally ascertained and the interest has become indefeasibly
fixed.47 Notice of the disclaimer must be sent to certain interested
parties.48 The property then passes as if the disclaimant had pre-
deceased the decedent.4 9 Acts which can be viewed as an accept-
ance of the property, such as conveyance, assignment, written
waiver or transfer, bar any later attempt to disclaim. ° (One
should be wary in complying with the requirements of this section,
to such other person as has legal title to, or possession of, the
property in which the interest disclaimed exists, and no such
executor, personal representative, trustee or person shall be
liable for any other proper distribution or other disposition
made without actual notice of the disclaimer.
Id. § 30-134.
47. Disclaimer; time for filing. The disclaimer shall be filed
within ten months after the death of the decedent or the donee
of the power, as the case may be, or if the taker of the prop-
erty or interest is not then finally ascertained or his interest
has not become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and in
quantity, then not later than ten months after the event when
the taker has become finally ascertained and his interest has
become indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity, or,
with respect to interedts indefeasibly fixed both in quality and
in quantity on August 27, 1971, within ten months after
August 27, 1971.
Id. § 30-133.
48. Id. § 30-134. See note 4G supra.
49. Disclaimer; filing; effect. (1) Unless the decedent or donee of
the power has otherwise provided by will, the property or in-
terest therein or part thereof disclaimed as provided in sec-
tions 30-131 to 30-134 shall descend or be distributed as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the decedent, or if the disclaim-
ant be one designated to take pursuant to a power of appoint-
ment exercised by a testamentary instrument, then as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the donee of the power. Unless
otherwise provided in the instrument of disclaimer as de-
scribed in section 30-132, the disclaimer shall relate back for
all purposes to the date of death of the decedent or of the
donee, as the case may be.
Id. § 30-135 (1).
50. Any conveyance of or contract to convey real property or any
interest therein, or assignment or transfer of or contract to as-
sign or transfer personal property, or written waiver of the
right to disclaim the succession to real or personal property,
by a beneficiary, or any sale or other disposition of real or
personal property pursuant to judicial process, made before
the expiration of the period in which he may disclaim as pro-
vided in sections 30-129 to 30-135, bars the right to disclaim
as to the property or interest.
Id. § 30-135 (2).
This specific provision for written waiver during the period for dis-
claimer solves the problem of the executor or trustee who finds it ad-
visable to sell property in the estate before the expiration of the dis-
claimer period, but cannot do so because the possibility of disclaimer
is a deterrent to potential buyers.
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for if the decision to disclaim is not made soon after the interest
has vested, the recipient/disclaimant may have destroyed the oppor-
tunity to disclaim by acting towards the property in a manner
which can be viewed as an acceptance.) Finally, the disclaimer of
spendthrift trusts is specifically provided for.5 '
A disclaimer may be made by anyone succeeding to an interest
in property which has passed by will, intestacy, deed, trust, in-
surance contract or otherwise, 52 and the property can be disclaimed
in whole or in part.53 Guardians, executors, administrators and
other personal representatives of minors, incompetents, or deceased
beneficiaries can disclaim on behalf of the beneficiary upon an or-
der of the probate court.54
51. Id. § 30-135(3).
52. Terms, defined. As used in sections 30-129 to 30-135, unless
the context otherwise requires:(1) Beneficiary shall mean and include any person en-
titled, but for his disclaimer, to take an interest, by intestate
succession, by devise, by legacy or bequest, by succession to
a disclaimed interest, by virtue of a renunciation and election
to take against a will, as beneficiary of a trust, pursuant to
the exercise or nonexercise of a power of appointment, as
donee of a power of appointment, as grantee, as donee, under
any assignment or instrument of conveyance or transfer, as
beneficiary of an insurance contract, or otherwise under a
testamentary or nontestamentary instrument;
Id. § 30-130(1).
53. Interest shall mean and include the whole of any property,
real or personal, legal or equitable, or any fractional part,
share or particular portion or specific assets thereof or any
estate in any such property or power to appoint, consume, ap-
ply or expend property or any other right, power, privilege
or immunity relating thereto; and
Id. § 30-130 (2).
Disclaimer filing. A beneficiary may disclaim any interest
est in whole or in part, or with reference to specific parts,
shares or assets thereof, by filing a disclaimer in the manner
provided in sections 30-129 to 30-135....
Id. § 30-131.
54. ... A guardian, executor, administrator or other personal
representative of the estate of a minor, incompetent or de-
ceased beneficiary, if he deems it in the best interest of those
interested in the estate of such beneficiary and of those who
take the beneficiary's interest by virtue of the disclaimer and
not detrimental to the best interest of the beneficiary, upon
an order of the probate court, may execute and file a dis-
claimer on behalf of the beneficiary within the time and in
the manner in which the beneficiary himself could disclaim
if he were living, of legal age and competent. A beneficiary
likewise may execute and file a disclaimer by agent or attor-
neys so empowered.
Id. § 30-131.
Although the power to disclaim is expressly given to guardians of
incompetents, it is questionable under current Nebraska law whether
DISCLAIMER
Disclaimers, when filed and recorded, are binding.5" They do
not impair other statutory rights such as renunciation and termina-
tion of powers of appointment,"0 and the law is applicable to inter-
ests outstanding on the date of enactment.
7
B. The New Nebraska Probate Code: Renunciation
The Disclaimer Act was in effect for only a short time before
it was again considered by the Unicameral, this time as a part of
such a disclaimer could ever be authorized by the court, for it might
not be in the "best interests" of the incompetent under the current
definition of that term. In Clarkson v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha,
193 Neb. 201, 226 N.W.2d 334 (1975), the Nebraska Supreme Court, in
a four to three decision, held that the best interests of a surviving in-
competent spouse in deciding whether to take under the will or elect
the statutory share require: (1) making the election which results in
the larger pecuniary value; (2) ignoring the interests of possible heirs
to the incompetent; and (3) ignoring whether the incompetent is pro-
vided for otherwise. If these same criteria are applied to the dis-
claimer power, that power could never be exercised, since the dis-
claimer would always result in a smaller pecuniary value vesting in
the incompetent.
By analogy such restrictions might also be applied to disclaimers
made by guardians for minors and maybe even to those by trustees
and conservators, for the Ciarkson "best interests" terminology of NEB.
Rzv. STAT. § 30-108 (Reissue 1964) is also contained in the new Probate
Code section on spousal election, NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2315 (Reissue
1975), the present Disclaimer Act, NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-129 (Cum.
Supp. 1974) and the new Probate Code section on conservators, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-2362 (Reissue 1975). The "best interests" language
is not contained in the new Probate Code general section on renuncia-
tion, NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2352 (Reissue 1975).
However, applying Clarkson's narrow pecuniary measure of "best
interests" to the disclaimer statutes would clearly go against the intent
of these statutes. Under such a definition no disclaimer could ever
be made if it meant foregoing some pecuniary value, and since most
disclaimers do involve letting something of value pass to another, the
use of disclaimer would be severely limited. It would be more con-
sistent with the intent of the disclaimer statutes if the definition of
best interests included considerations besides pecuniary value.
The rules of Clarkson may not be as restrictive as they have just
been made to seem since the court also held that it would not entirely
ignore what the surviving spouse might have done had that spouse
been able to make the election. Also, the rule that the larger pecuni-
ary value should be chosen was not an absolute rule, but only one
which should be applied in most instances. Disclaimer would seem
to be one of those instances where the "pecuniary value" rule should
not apply. For a more detailed discussion of the problems raised by
the Clarkson case, see Note, 9 CP=EGHTON L. REV. 205 (1975).
55. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-135 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
56. Id. § 30-135(5).
57. Id. § 30-135(6).
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the proposed Nebraska Uniform Probate Code,58 which was adopted,
as modified, with an effective date of January 1, 1977. 59 Until then
the Disclaimer Act is the operative law on disclaimers, but after
that date, section 30-2352 on renunciation of succession will gov-
ern.60
Differences between the present and future law on disclaimer,
or renunciation as it is denominated in the new section, are purpose-
fully slight since the Uniform Probate Code, as originally proposed,
was specifically rewritten to retain the features of the Disclaimer
Act.61 The language of section 2-801 of the Uniform Probate Code
which applies only to intestate succession and testamentary inter-
ests was expressly expanded to include the Disclaimer Act and its
provisions for nontestamentary instruments.62
Though similar, the two laws do differ in a few areas. While
the present law makes no provision for disclaimers by trustees or
conservators, 63 section 30-2352 of the new Probate Code specifically
allows a court to authorize a trustee to renounce certain powers
if such renunciation furthers the purposes of the trust,64 and section
58. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801.
59. See the introductory remarks to the new Nebraska Probate Code be-
fore Article 22, NEB. REV. STAT. § 30 (Reissue 1975). The Nebraska
Comments to the new Probate Code can be found in the 1974 Cumula-
tive Supplement and the 1975 Reissue of Volume IIA. Since these
Comments can be a valuable interpretive tool, copies of the 1974
supplement and 1975 Volume IIA should be retained even after later
editions without the Comments are published.
60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2352 (Reissue 1975).
61. Nebraska Legislature Judiciary Committee, Preliminary Interim Study
Report on a Revised Nebraska Probate Code 115 (Sept. 1973) [here-
inafter cited as Preliminary Study].
62. Id.
63. All conservators are not covered by the provisions in the present stat-
ute. Although conservators can represent minors and so can disclaim
for them under the provisions of NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-131 (Cum. Supp.
1974), they do not represent incompetents or deceased beneficiaries,
but only those with an age or a physical disability. Id. § 38-901 (Re-
issue 1974). A conservator representing a physically disabled person
could not disclaim under NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-131 or any of the other
current provisions.
64. The appropriate court may direct or permit a trustee under
a testamentary or nontestamentary instrument to renounce or
deviate from any power of administration, management or al-
location of benefit upon finding that exercise of such power
may defeat or impair the accomplishment of the purposes of
the trust whether by the imposition of tax or the allocation
of beneficial interest inconsistent with such purposes. Such
authority shall be exercised after hearing and upon notice to
all known persons beneficially interested in such trust, in the
manner directed by said court.
Id. § 30-2352 (a) (3) (Reissue 1975).
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30-2637 provides for judicially authorized or directed renunciation
by a conservator. 5 Under section 30-2637 a conservator has the ex-
plicit authority to renounce gifts as well as powers, while the trust-
ee's renunciation abilities are limited to the renunciation of powers
alone. The Preliminary Interim Study Report on the new Probate
Code indicates that a trustee should also have the authority to re-
nounce gifts.66 Section 30-2352 also includes surviving joint owners
or joint tenants among those permitted to renounce a power only
implicitly present in the broad language of the current Disclaimer
Act.6 7 The purpose of this amendment was to make explicit that
joint owners could disclaim a survivorship interest. 8
Another difference between the two acts involves the time pe-
riod in which one may disclaim. The present Disclaimer Act calls
for filing the disclaimer within ten months after death, or if the
taker is not ascertained or the interest has not become indefeasibly
fixed both in quality and quantity, then not until ten months after
the event which determines these factors.6 9 The new section calls
for filing within nine months after death (which coincides with the
time limit for filing the estate tax return), or within nine months
after the taker of the interest is finally ascertained. 70 The language
of the Disclaimer Act which refers to the interest being indefeasibly
fixed in quality and quantity has been dropped.
The breadth of these provisions demonstrates that the Dis-
claimer Act and the new Probate Code were both designed to apply
to almost any situation. Unlike the common law disclaimer rule,
both intestate and testate takers may disclaim. Nor are disclaimers
limited to the estate situation. Any "succession" to property may
be disclaimed, whether it comes through a will or by intestacy,
power of appointment, disclaimer or otherwise. Even future inter-
ests may be disclaimed, as shown by the "beneficiary of a trust"
and "pursuant to the exercise ... of a power of appointment" lan-
guage of section 30-130 (1).71
65. Id. § 30-2637.
66. Preliminary Study supra. note 61, at 115.
67. Technical Memorandum on Amendments Proposed by the Judiciary
Committee to L.B. 354, § 74, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. (Dec. 21, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Technical Memorandum].
68. Id.
69. See note 47 supra.
70. The writing specified in (a) must be filed within nine months
after the death of the decedent, settlor of the trust or donee
of the power, or if the taker of the property is not then finally
ascertained not later than nine months after the event by
which the taker or the interest is finally ascertained.
NEE. REV. STAT. § 30-2352 (b) (Reissue 1975).
71. See Report, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dis-
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Other advantages of the Disclaimer Act and the new Probate
Code sections are the abolition of the common law rules against
partial disclaimers and disclaimers of spendthrift trusts, 72 the inclu-
sion of nonprobate life insurance proceeds as property that can be
disclaimed,'7 3 and the establishment of definite procedures for dis-
claiming.
Both statutes clarify who is entitled to take after property has
been disclaimed. The disposition after disclaimer is as if the dis-
claimant had "predeceased" the decedent and the time "relates
back," bringing the state rules on lapse into effect.7 4 Unless
otherwise directed by the decedent in the will, the interest goes
to the disclaimant's then living relatives if he is a relative of the
testator; under current law (but not under the new Probate Code
lapse statute7 5), it passes to the members of the class if it is a class
gift; or if neither of these applies, the interest becomes part of the
residue. Since the disclaimant cannot designate who will take the
property unless he has been given a special power of appointment
in the will, but can only allow the property to pass according to
the statute, the effect of such disclaimer should be determined be-
fore the decision to disclaim is made. The disclaimant should also
be careful to renounce both his testate and intestate share if dis-
claiming under the will would still leave him as the heir at law.
Similar precautions should be taken if he is both a legatee and a
residuary beneficiary, for if this is not done, he could end up re-
ceiving property in spite of the disclaimer. However, there may
be instances where it is beneficial to disclaim only one of these
interests and still take under the other. In any case, the dispository
positions--Suggestions for a Model Act, 3 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST
J. 131, 133 (1968).
72. See notes 35 and 37 supra.
73. No cases are reported which allow a common law disclaimer of in-
sdfrance proceeds, but it would appear that federal law specifically rec-
ognizes the disclaimer of life insurance proceeds if that disclaimer is
effective under local law. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (d)-i (1958).
74. NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 30-288.03 (Reissue 1975) is the current anti-lapse
statute. It prevents the common law lapse of a devise which would
occur if the devisee died before the testator, but only if that devisee
is a relative of the testator. Instead of lapsing and passing by intes-
tacy, the devise passes to the relatives of the devisee; however, the
devise does lapse if the deceased devisee has no living relatives. Nie-
mann v. Zacharias, 185 Neb. 450, 176 N.W.2d 671 (1970). The new
Nebraska Probate Code provides for essentially the same result with
some refinements. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2343 (Reissue 1975).
75. Section 30-2343 of the new Probate Code makes the anti-lapse section
apply to class gifts as well and thus passes the devise to the living
relatives of the deceased devisee instead of to the other class members.
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consequences of disclaimer should be considered just as carefully
as the tax consequences.
These two acts cover those interests outstanding on the date of
their enactment so long as the interests of third parties arising prior
to that time are not affected. Although these are new laws applied
to old trusts and wills, they both are procedural in nature, neither
impairs the vested rights of third parties, and both extend a new
remedy rather than operate as a limitation. Because of these quali-
ties, both statutes are probably constitutional as applied to existing
as well as to future estates and trusts.76
Finally, both statutes are probably exclusive. There is no longer
a common law of disclaimer in Nebraska-if there ever was one.
As pointed out in the testimony before the Judiciary Committee,
these acts were to be the codification of the common law which
did not exist in Nebraska.77 That fact, together with the section
protecting from abridgement only those rights arising under statute
and not those arising under the common law, indicate that these
statutes are to be the only law on disclaimer in Nebraska. Since
there was no prior law, only the potentially restrictive common law
from other jurisdictions, Nebraskans would seem to be better off
under the statutes even in cases where the time limit might be re-
strictive.78  What previously was an uncharted wilderness where
few dared to venture is now a carefully mapped area of the law;
therefore, even the most timid should not refuse to use disclaimers.
IV. REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES
Although both Nebraska disclaimer provisions were evidently
designed to be broad grants of power to facilitate the use of dis-
claimers as a post-mortem tax tool, 9 there are still a few areas of
uncertainty. However, these should not deter the use of disclaimer,
for there is usually nothing to lose and only something to gain since
disclaimers are really after-the-fact attempts to remedy an already
disadvantageous situation.
76. New laws have been held to be constitutional as applied to prior exist-
ing trusts and estates. See In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173
A.2d 86 (1961), where the court allowed the Uniform Principal and
Income Act to apply to a trust previously in existence.
77. Hearings on L.B. 535, supra note 42.
78. The state time limit could be more restrictive than the federal law
in a case where a marital or charitable deduction could be made later
than nine or ten months after decedent's death because of a grant of
an extension on the time for filing under CODE § 6081.
79. See Hearings on L.B. 535, supra note 42, and the Uniform Probate Code
Comment to NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2352 (Supp. 1974).
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A. Joint Tenants
One major uncertainty is the scope of the provision on disclaim-
ing jointly-held property. First, although the new provision does
specifically include joint tenants and joint owners among those em-
powered to disclaim, it is not clear what part of the joint property
may be disclaimed-all of it, that part representing the contribu-
tion of the decedent,8 0 or the part that could have been severed
had the decedent chosen to end the joint tenancy. Second, there
is no specific reference to joint tenants or joint owners in the cur-
rent Disclaimer Act. Under common law there is some doubt that
joint tenants can disclaim."' Therefore, it is questionable whether
this power exists in the absence of a specific statutory grant.
Both problems appear to have a solution in the Technical Memo-
randum of the Judicary Committee on L.B. 354 which states:
This amendment makes explicit that a surviving joint owner
or surviving joint tenant can disclaim a survivorship interest, a
rule that is implied in both the present disclaimer statutes and
section 74 as originally written. 82
If this Technical Memorandum is determinative of the law, the first
problem dealing with what portion of the joint property may be
disclaimed disappears, for it is now clear that the property to be
disclaimed is the survivorship interest. Under Nebraska joint ten-
ancy law that would be the interest indefeasibly vested in the de-
ceased joint tenant from the creation of the tenancy. Since by defi-
nition the interests of joint tenants are equal, in a two-party ten-
ancy the survivorship interest would be one-half of the property.
The second problem, i.e., whether the current law applies to joint
property at all, also appears to be solved since it is asserted that
the Disclaimer. Act carries an implication that joint tenants and
joint owners are to be included. Although a technical memoran-
dum is not conclusive of legislative intent when the statute as
passed is not clear on its face, it is strong evidence of how the stat-
ute is to be interpreted and would be difficult for a court to ignore.
80. If the part corresponding with the contributions of the decedent were
disclaimable, the treatment would correspond to the Service's ap-
proach to joint ownership under the estate tax laws. CODE § 2040. This
very specific statutory approach to the treatment of joint property was
added to the Code because of the inequities between the tax burden
on joint owners in community property states and in noncommunity
property states. This is perhaps the best example of the federal rejec-
tion of the local law of property for the purposes of the federal tax
and application of its own property standards.
81. See note 36 supra.
82. Technical Memorandum, § 74.
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Even if it is clear that it is the survivorship interest that can
be disclaimed, the effect of disclaimer on multiple joint tenancies
is troublesome. The impact on a two-party joint tenancy is fairly
simple. While alive, each party has a one-half interest in the prop-
erty. When the joint tenancy ends at the death of one of the ten-
ants and the survivor disclaims, a new tenancy between the survi-
vor and the person(s) taking under the disclaimer is formed, but
it is a tenancy-in-common rather than a joint tenancy. The sur-
vivor retains a one-half interest in the whole, but has no right of
survivorship in the remaining half.
If there are multiple tenants, the situation becomes more com-
plicated. If A, B and C are joint tenants, each has a one-third inter-
est in the property. If A dies, B and C each receive one-half of
A's share and so remain equal joint tenants. If A dies and B dis-
claims his survivorship interest in A's share, there are various possi-
bilities. Does C get all of A's third (one-sixth for his survivorship
share and one-sixth for B's disclaimed share), or does C only get
his own survivorship share with the other sixth passing to A's
heirs? C probably should get all of A's interest since the disposi-
tion is supposed to be as if B predeceased A; however, it can be
argued that B's disclaimer severs the joint tenancy for all three
tenants and thus destroys all right of survivorship in A's share. If
the situation arises where A's heirs and the joint tenants are differ-
ent people, the point will surely be litigated.
Assuming that C gets all of A's share, a second consideration
is whether B's disclaimer severs the remaining joint tenancy be-
tween B and C, or whether B still has a survivorship interest in
C's share. The answer may be that B and C still have a joint ten-
ancy in B and C's original two-thirds plus C's half of A's portion
but that they have a tenancy-in-common in the remaining half of
A's share which B disclaimed,83 or the tenancy-in-common may ap-
ply to all of A's disclaimed share now belonging to C.
Since the answers are uncertain, B should also be sure to dis-
claim the survivorship interest with C if he does not ever wish to
receive that property. If B and C wish to maintain the survivorship
right, then perhaps a new conveyance to that effect should be made,
even though it is possible that such a transaction might involve gift
tax consequences. A declaratory judgment action to determine the
rights of the various parties would be useful in this situation.
The joint bank account presents another aspect of the joint
property problem because of the nature of the ownership involved.
83. See C. MoYNII I'NToRDUCTIoN To Tmm LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY 221
(1962).
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In a typical joint bank account any person named as joint owner
has the legal right to remove or add funds without the permission
of any other owner.s4 Each joint owner thus has a present and
completed interest in the property, independent of the death of any
other owner. Under the common law this present interest would
be enough to defeat any attempted disclaimer since nothing would
be considered as passing at death. 5 This is the same type of rea-
soning behind the common law restriction on disclaiming any
jointly held property,8 6 but in this situation there is added justifica-
tion in that the property in a joint bank account could be with-
drawn and used by just one of the owners without any action being
taken by the other. However, where the person attempting to dis-
claim the account never contributed to it and never truly had any
control over it despite the dual names on the account, it would seem
reasonable to allow the disclaimer. This would be consistent with
the purposes of the Disclaimer Act, for if the disclaimant did not
in fact have possession of the property, he should not be forced to
accept it at the time of the true owner's death. Other situations
exist where the true ownership rights are different than the ac-
count title; for example, a partnership account with unequal contri-
84. When a deposit in this state is made in the name of two or
more persons, deliverable or payable to either or to their sur-
vivor or survivors, such deposit, or any part thereof, or in-
crease thereof, may be delivered or paid to either of such per-
sons or to the survivor or survivors in the due course of busi-
ness.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-136 (Reissue 1974).
The predecessor of this statute, NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-167 (1943), has
been held to provide for the same disposition of the property. Rose
v. Hooper, 175 Neb. 645, 122 N.W.2d 753 (1963). That predecessor stat-
ute was also held to fix the property rights as between the parties
named on the account. Tobas v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 147 Neb.
676, 24 N.W.2d 870 (1946).
85. The law in the area is illustrated by the case of Krakoff v. United
States, 439 F.2d 1023 (1971), in which the decedent's widow attempted
to renounce her rights as the surviving joint tenant in several joint
savings accounts. The funds, which were previously nonprobate prop-
erty because they were held jointly with rights of survivorship, passed
through the probate estate and to the four surviving children. The
Service claimed that this was a taxable gift from the widow to her
four children. The federal district court agreed with the Service
in spite of an earlier ruling by the state probate court on the valid-
ity of the disclaimer in favor of the widow. Disregarding the pro-
bate court's ruling as not determinative of the state law, the federal
court held that under other cases which were determinative of the lo-
cal law, the widow had acquired full title by virtue of the contracts
creating the tenancies and, therefore, could not disclaim. She had full
withdrawal and deposit rights and so had full title.
86. See note 36 supra.
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butions from the partners. If in the partnership agreement each
partner could only withdraw amounts up to his contribution, each
partner should be able to disclaim funds not traceable to his contri-
bution.
Whether joint bank account funds may be disclaimed under the
present Disclaimer Act has not been decided by the court. The cur-
rent law makes provision for disclaiming that which passes by suc-
cession, not that which is already owned; therefore, if the reasoning
of other jurisdictions is applied,8 7 funds from an account with un-
limited withdrawal and deposit rights would not pass from the de-
cedent at death, but would belong to the survivor from the creation
of the account and could not be disclaimed. If it can be shown that
the true rights to the account were limited in some way, disclaimer
should be allowed.
Under the new Probate Code the result would be more certain
because Article 27 on nonprobate transfers redefines the legal inter-
ests of multiple party account holders.8 8 No longer may a joint
account be treated as the entire property of each party during his
lifetime, but it must be considered each party's property only in
proportion to his net contribution.89 These new sections will thus
make it possible to renounce that portion of joint accounts which
can be traced to the decedent, since that part now passes by sur-
vivorship and not on the creation of the account.
B. Time to Disclaim
A second area of uncertainty under the Nebraska disclaimer pro-
visions is the time period within which the disclaimer must be
made. The present Disclaimer Act provides that a remainder inter-
est need not be disclaimed until both its taker and its quality and
quantity are indefeasibly fixed.0° This broad provision would allow
a remainderman to wait for the death of the life tenant before de-
ciding whether to disclaim. The new Probate Code provision short-
ens the time period within which to disclaim and has somewhat dif-
ferent language governing when the period begins to run.91 It
provides that if the taker is not finally ascertained within nine
months after the death of the decedent, the time period for dis-
claiming is nine months after the event by which the taker or the
interest is finally ascertained. One possible interpretation of this
87. See note 80 supra.
88. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2701 et seq. (Reissue 1975).
89. Id. §§ 30-2703, 30-2704.
90. Id. § 30-133 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See note 47 supra.
91. Id. § 30-2352(b) (Reissue 1975). See note 70 supra.
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language is that the extra time period is available only in those
instances where the intended beneficiaries are unborn or otherwise
unascertainable. If such is the case, known but contingent bene-
ficiaries would have to disclaim long before they were certain of
receiving any property. A child left a remainder in his grandfath-
er's will subject to a life estate in his parents would have only nine
months to disclaim property he might not get for 50 years, if ever.
A broader interpretation of this language is that the taker is not
ascertained until he is certain of his right to take and thus dis-
claimer of any kind of conditional interest can always be postponed.
The grandchild in the example above would have until the statu-
tory time after his parents' death to disclaim the grandfather's
property.
There is no legislative history indicating why the wording of the
new statute was changed from that of the present Disclaimer Act,
92
but when examined in view of the broad scope of the statute as
a whole, it would seem inconsistent with the general intent of the
Unicameral or Uniform Probate Code drafters if this section were
given a restrictive interpretation. Even the federal rule on dis-
claimer seems to be that a disclaimer can be made until a reasonable
time after the remainder interest is no longer subject to divest-
ment 3
C. Partial Disclaimer
Partial disclaimer is yet another area left uncertain by both the
present and future Nebraska statutes on disclaimer. The present
Disclaimer Act allows a partial disclaimer by saying simply that
a beneficiary may disclaim "in whole or in part, or with reference
to specific parts, shares or assets thereof. '94 The new Probate Code
adds the word "fractional" before "shares." 95 This language could
be interpreted as applying the same kind of "severable part" restric-
tion employed by the common law courts in allowing or disallowing
disclaimers.9 6 If this is the case, the Disclaimer Act and the new
Probate Code have added nothing to the law and disclaimants
would still be restricted to disclaiming only what a court deems
92. The old wording reflected the Minnesota and Illinois statutes on which
the Nebraska Disclaimer Act was modeled. See notes 40 and 41 supra.
The new wording is that of the Uniform Probate Code. There is no
legislative history indicating any significance in this change.
93. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
94. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-131 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See note 53 supra.
95. Id. § 30-2352(a) (1) (Reissue 1975).
96. See note 35 supra.
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severable. Conversely, if the language is interpreted in its broadest
sense, any portion of a successor interest may be disclaimed
whether or not it is severable in the common law sense. In view
of the broad purpose of the Disclaimer Act and section 2-801 of
the Uniform Probate Code, which is to make disclaimer a more use-
ful tool,97 this latter interpretation would seem correct. As stated
in the testimony before the Judiciary Committee, a disclaimer "has
long been recognized as a necessary tool of estate planning ... by
the use of disclaimer it permits an estate planner to take a second
look . . . to determine whether the initial estate plan which was
drafted is correct or whether it needs revision. '98
As an extreme example under this broad interpretation, it would
be possible to create a life estate out of a fee by disclaiming the
remainder. In most cases this remainder would then pass to the
disclaimant's descendants. The effect of such a disclaimer would be
to avoid the estate tax on the property at the disclaimant's death
while still allowing the disclaimant to keep the benefit of the prop-
erty during his lifetime and permit his heirs take at his death.
This may appear to be a drastic extension of disclaimer, yet it
is well within the broad purpose of the disclaimer statutes and al-
lows no more than is permitted under the Code and regulation sec-
tions governing the taxing of life estates with remainders over
when they are created by trusts or wills. A decedent may leave
a life estate with a remainder over and have that property taxed
only in his estate and that of the remaindermen, skipping the tax
on the life tenant.99 If the disclaimer is truly to provide the estate
planner with a second look, this tax advantage should also be avail-
able by using a disclaimer. To allow beneficial tax treatment in
the case where the decedent gave a life estate but to disallow it
where he simply gave a fee or died intestate is similar to the old
common law distinction between allowing the disclaimer of testate
property and disallowing it for intestate property.10 0 There is little
reasonable basis for such discrimination in either example.
97. See note 79 supra.
98. Hearings on L.B. 535, supra note 42, at 28.
99. The CoDE does not allow a decedent to retain a life estate in himself
and then pass it at death without a tax, but this is not the analogous
situation to the disclaimer hypothetical. Under a disclaimer, property
passes from the decedent to the remainderman without first vesting
in the life tenant. The life tenant never accepts the property (in this
case, the remainder) and thus has nothing upon which a tax can be
levied under current law.
100. See note 34 supra.
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D. Insolvency
The present and future Nebraska statutes on disclaimer do not
determine whether insolvency has any effect on the ability to dis-
claim. Some states have provided for the protection of creditors, 10 1
while others allow disclaimers in spite of creditors. 0 2 At least two
courts in jurisdictions with statutes similar to ours have allowed
disclaimers by insolvent recipients. 0 3 In both cases the statutes
governing disclaimer made the disclaimer retroactive to the dece-
dent's death and passed the property as if the disclaimant had pre-
deceased the decedent. The property, therefore, was never con-
sidered as belonging to the disclaimant and so could not be claimed
by the creditors. This approach, whether or not it is wise, is consis-
tent with the theory underlying disclaimer. However, even under
it, a disclaimer could be denied where the disclaimant has caused
creditors to rely to their detriment on an apparent acceptance of the
property or where there was collusion by the disclaimant and some
other party to the detriment of the creditors. Courts can interpret
the facts in such situations to imply an acceptance of the property
before the disclaimer was attempted, and thus invalidate the dis-
claimer.
E. United States Savings Bonds
United States Savings Bonds are properties which pass at death,
but they are unique in some respects. The Secretary of the Treas-
ury has the power to issue bonds "in such manner and subject to
such terms and conditions consistent with subsections (b)-(d) of
this section, and including any restrictions on their transfer, as the
Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time prescribe.' 10 4
Pursuant to this authorization, the Secretary has issued Regulations
on United States Savings Bonds,'0 5 which control all rights and in-
terests in the bonds,10 6 and supercede any state property law. Some
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 689.21(6), 731.37(6) (1969); BURNs IND. STAT.
ANN. § 29-1-6-4 (1972); LA. Crv. CoDE AvN. art. 1021 (1952); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 501.211(6) (Supp. 1976), 525.532(6) (Reissue 1975);
VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 474.490 (1956); REv. CODE WAsH. ANN. §
11.86.060 (1974 Supp.).
102. LAws or MD. ch. 11, § 9-101 (1974); Onx. Rsv. STAT. § 112.675 (1973).
103. Hoecker v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1973);
In re Estate of Hansen, 109 fli. App. 2d 283, 248 N.E.2d 709 (1969).
104. 31 U.S.C. § 757c (a).
105. Regulations Governing United States Savings Bonds, 31 C.F.R. § 315
(1973).
106. See United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973) (per curium), Free
v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). In re Estate of Kriter, 196 Neb. 482,
243 N.W.2d 773 (1976); Nelson v. Rasmussen, 164 Neb. 274, 82 N.W.2d
418 (1957).
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of these regulations place direct restrictions on the transfer of the
bonds: the form of the registration must express the actual owner-
ship of and interest in the bonds; 10 7 the bonds are not transferable
and are payable only to the owners named thereon; 0 8 a surviving
co-owner will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the
bonds, 0 9 as will a surviving beneficiary;1 10 and no judicial determi-
nation will be recognized which would give effect to an attempted
voluntary inter vivos transfer of a bond." 1 These regulations make
no provision for recognizing a disclaimer. The position of the
Treasury Department is that they would accept the surrender of
the surviving owner's interest and would issue new bonds, but that
such a surrender would constitute a taxable event for the purposes
of reporting accrued interest for income tax and might also raise
a gift tax question."1 2
Lower courts have found exceptions to the all-encompassing
Treasury Department control of bond transfer rights in litigation
which has arisen between private parties or which has been re-
motely related to the purpose of the regulations.1 3 Whether this
approach could be stretched to cover a disclaimer is doubtful, espe-
cially in light of the Supreme Court decision which did not recog-
nize a gift between bond co-owners as being valid for purposes of
excluding the bond from the decedent's taxable estate when the
bond was not reregistered in the recipient's name as required by
the regulations." 4 Even if one were successful in persuading a
court to ignore the transfer regulations, the regulation providing
that a co-owner bond will be paid to either co-owner upon his sep-
arate request"15 is an added hurdle, for this makes the rights in
the bond analogous to the rights in joint bank accounts under the
common law." 6
Though a co-owner probably is precluded from disclaiming by
the Treasury Department bond regulations, a beneficiary may not
107. 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1973).
108. Id. § 315.15.
109. Id. § 315.62.
110. Id. § 315.67.
111. Id. § 315.20(a).
112. Letter from C. Gardner, Director, Division of Transactions and Rul-
ings, Fiscal Service, Department of the Treasury to Herbert L. Jack-
man, Attorney, October 18, 1975, on file in the Nebraska Law Review
Office.
113. For a general discussion of the cases in this area, see the district court
opinion in Chandler v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Cal.
1970), rev'd 410 U.S. 257 (1973).
114. 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1973).
115. Id. § 315.60.
116, See section IV (A) supra.
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be so limited even though section 315.67 says that a surviving bene-
ficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner. If the
disclaimer is properly made under state law, it can be argued that
the intended beneficiary is not truly the beneficiary at all, because
in an effective disclaimer the disclaimant is considered as never
having had any interest in the property.
As of yet there have been no cases on co-owner or beneficiary
disclaimer, but this may be an area which justifies a calculated risk,
even though the Treasury Department's position is squarely against
disclaimer in the co-owner situation. The consequence of losing is
that the disclaimer is taxed as a gift. Not only the amount of the
bonds, but also the amount of the gift tax which must be paid are
then both out of the disclaimant's estate at the more advantageous
gift tax rates. Win or lose, the taxpayer comes out ahead.
VI. CONCLUSION
A disclaimer or renunciation can be a most valuable tool in post-
mortem estate planning. Because of the necessary federal reliance
on the local law of disclaimer, the Nebraskan with a problem which
is correctible by a disclaimer is in an excellent position, for under
Nebraska law it is currently possible to take advantage of most of
the benefits available under disclaimer. The present and future
Nebraska laws do away with common law restrictions on disclaimer
and grant broad powers to disclaim a survivorship interest in any
kind of property, in whole or in part. After the new Probate Code
comes into operation in 1977, even greater use of disclaimer may
be possible because of the change in the law governing survivorship
interests in joint bank accounts and the inclusion of trustees and
conservators among those empowered to disclaim. Absent new fed-
eral legislation removing the influence of local law and establishing
purely federal disclaimer standards for tax purposes, Nebraskans
are in a most enviable position.
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